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INTRODUC'l'ION 
I  would  like to  thank  you  very  much  for  having  invited me 
to  speak  before  the  Management  Purchasing Association of 
New  York. 
It has  been  pointed out in various  circles that Europe  is 
becoming  progressively stronger economically  and  more  con-
scious of the  entity it represents politically at a  moment 
when  the  United States  is  confronted with  economic  diffi-
culties and  is attempting to  redefine  the  goals  and  respon-
sibilities of its foreign  policy. 
These  facts  do  not,  however,  justify the  use  of  such  labels 
as  an  "isolationist America"  and  an  "inward-looking Europe". 
Such  cliches  are  dangerous  in  that they distort reality and 
risk creating reactions of mistrust at a  moment  which  is 
essential  for  the  evolution of  the  economic  and  trade re-
lations  between  the enlarging Europe  and  the  United States. 
Never  has  Europe  gone  so  are  towards  cooperation  as it has 
since  the  advent of the  European  Economic  Community. 
In  order  to  identify the  new  links  which  unite  the Member 
States,  it is better to  speak of  economic  integration.  The 
reinforcement of this  Corruuunity  and  the  enlargement of the 
Europe  of Six  to  the  Europe  of Ten with  the  expected entry, 
on  January  1,  1973,  of  the  United  Kingdom,  Ireland,  Denmark, 
and  Norway,  constitute  a  new  phenomenon. 
Because  this  phenomenon  is  new,  it is disconcerting  to  the 
point that in  the  U.S.,  its positive results are  easily  for-
gotten  and  only  the difficulties  that integration could create 
for  the American  economy  are  emphasized. 
I  would  like to  express  some  thoughts  concerning: 
firstly,  the  prospects  for  the  United States  vis-~-vis the 
enlargement of  the  European  Community; 
- secondly,  in  the  context of  the  enlarged Community,  the  needs 
for  new  forms  of  cooperation  between  the  U.S.  and  the  Europe 
of  Ten. 
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I  •  ARE  THE  PROSPECTS  OF  ENLARGEMEWr  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COM1<1UNITY  .  ....  .  =  ==,:;.;....;:;~::.;:;:_-=··=.:;o._..=;:.;;;,.;.;;:..;;...;;;.;;,;;,;:.:_....;;;...:...;_......;;-"---
FOLLOWING  THE  ENTRY  OF'  GREAT  BRITAIN  1  IRELAND,  DENMARK,  AND 
NORWAY  VERY  FAVORABLT!.:  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES  ? 
1)  The  enlargement of  the  Community  should  foster  a  new  growth 
in  international  trade  and  consequently  for  u.s.  exports. 
A  certain number  of mechanical  factors  ought normally  to  have 
the effect of intensifying trade with  the  countries which will 
make  up  the Europe  of Ten,  notably with Great Britain. 
The  common  external tariff of  the  Europe  of Six,  taking  into 
account  the  final  result of the  Kennedy  Round,  is lower  than 
that of  the  United  Kingdom,  6  % for  the  Community  and  7.6  % 
for  the  United  Kingdom.  Entry  into  the  Common  Market  :rrrill  be 
accompanied  therefore  by  a  reduction of British tariff protection. 
Enlargement will  also eliminate  the  preferences  which  the  United 
Kingdom  granted  to  products  imported  from  Commonwealth  countries. 
The  economic  weight of  the enlarged Community  in  relation  to  the 
United States is often overestimated as  well  as  the  degree  to 
which  the  Community  will be  competing with  American  exports  in 
the  future.  It has  been  emphasized,  indeed,  that  the  Europe  of 
Ten  alone  is responsible  for  over  40  % of world  trade  and  that 
its exports,  valued at about  $55  billion in  1970,  are  considerably 
greater  than  those  of  the  United States,  which  reached  $43  billion. 
What  must not be  forgotten  is  the  fact that the  enlarged Community's 
gross  national  product is only  $635  billion compared with  a  GNP  of 
more  than  $1000  billion for  the  United States.  Furthermore,  per 
capita industrial production  in the  United States is  double  that 
of Europe. 
The  fact  that the  foreign  trade  of  the  Community  is very  important 
should  be  reassuring  for  those of its partners  who  fear  that it 
could be  protectionist.  The  Europe  of  Ten  cannot  afford to  be 
protectionist because  international  trade  represents  too  substan-
tial  a  contribution to its GNP. 
It is  enough  to  recall,  for  example,  that  the  United  Kingdom's 
exports of  goods  and  services  represent  26  % of its GNP  and  that 
the  U.K.  imports  about half of its foodstuffs  and  the  bulk of 
its raw materials. 
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The  dynamism  of  the  economic  expansion within  the  enlarged 
Community  ought  to  be  very  important  for  the  expansion of U.S. 
trade.  Experience  has  shown  that the  Member  States of the 
Europe  of Six benefitted more  than  Great Britain  from  the 
period  1960=1970,  enjoying  a  rate of economic  growth  of  about 
55  % a  year,  this  rate being  only  about  3  % in  the British economy. 
The  Community  of Six's  imports  from  third countries  reached  more 
than  $45  billion in  1970  and,  on  the  same  basis,  the  Community  of 
Ten  imported  $70  billion.  It has  been estimated that if the 
British entered  the  Common  Market  in  1973,  the  Community  would 
represent  an  export market  in  1980,  seven  years  later,  of  about 
$130  billion,  which  gives  some  idea of the possibilities that 
would  be  open  to American  exporters. 
2)  Though it is generally  agreed  that,  in  the  long  term, 
enlargement of the  Community  will  be  favorable  to  the 
United States,  there are still exaggerated  fears  con-
cerning short  term risks. 
Within  the  U.S.  Government,  attempts  have  been made  to  quantify 
the  export losses  which  could result in  the  short  term  from  en-
largement,  making  a  distinction between  industrial  and  agricul-
tural  products. 
For  the industrial products  exported by  the  United States  to 
the  ten countries of  the  enlarged Community,  the  maximum effect 
on  u.s.  exports  would  be  an  export loss of  about  $70  billion. 
This  figure  would  be  higher  and  would  surpass  $300  million  should 
the  Community  of  Ten  create  a  completely  free  trade  zone  with  the 
EFTA  members  which will not  join  the  Community,  such  as  Switzerland, 
Sweden,  and Austria. 
Then,  it would  be  necessary  to  add  from  $50  to  $100  million to 
take  into account  the  effects of the  association's  agreement  signed 
with  the Mediterranean  countries  and  the  countries  of the African 
Commonwealth  or  the  Caribbean. 
For  agricultural products,  it is appropriate  to note  that u.s. 
agricultural exports  to  the  new  members  - the  United Kingdom, 
Ireland,  Norway  and  Denmark  - are  much  smaller  than  agricultural 
exports  to  the  Europe  of Six. 
. ..  I ... The  U.S.  studies previously referred to  have  shown  that for 
agricultural exports  to  the  new  members  of the  Community,  which 
amount  to  $600  million at the  present  time,  export losses  re-
sulting from  enlargement  could be  about  $100  million.  The 
products  most  greatly affected would  be  coarse  grains. 
Of  course,  such  figures  entail  a  margin of uncertainty  for it 
is very difficult to precisely define  a  changing  realityo  They 
are,  however,  very  interesting as  terms  of reference. 
For  agricultural  and  industrial products  taken  as  a  whole,  it 
is noticed that  the  volume  of the  export  trade of the United 
States liable to  be  affected in  the  short  term varies  between 
$220  and  $570  million. 
If the  above  figures  were  compared  to  total u.s.  exports  not 
only  toward  the  Europe of Ten,  where  they  reached  about  $12.5 
billion in  1970,  but also  toward  the  non-candidate  EFTA  coun-
tries  and  countries  associated with  the  Community,  the possible 
U.S.  export losses  in the  short  term are  really very  low. 
I  would  like  to  argue  that  the  estimates of these  losses  are  even 
much  too  high  for  the  following  reasons  : 
Firstly,  these  estimates  were  made  before  the  conclusion of the 
monetary  agreements  of  December,  1971,  in Washington  and,  moreover, 
they  do  not  take  into  account  the  trade  concessions  made  by  the 
Community  in February,  1972. 
Concerning  the  impact of  the  future  agreements  between  the  Community 
of Ten  and  the  EFTA  countries,  the  consequences  of these  agreements 
for  the  United States must  be  minimized.  These  arrangements  re-
lative  to  the  new  conditions of trade  between  the  Europe  of Ten 
on  one  hand,  and  Switzerland,  Sweden,  Austria,  Portugal,  Finland, 
and  Iceland on  the  other  hand,  will be  put  into effect progressive-
ly,  particularly for  certain products  considered  "sensitive"  by 
the  Community. 
For  certain products of  advanced  technology  such  as  aircraft and 
computers,  entry into European  market  is  affected less  by  the  fact 
of enlargement  than  by  the  competitiveness  of the  American  industry 
itself. 
As  for  agriculture,  U.S.  soya  exports  to  the  British market  are 
still insignificant since  the  United  Kingdom utilizes essentially 
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coarse grains  for  animal  feed.  The  reduction  of the  United 
Kingdom's  import duties  on  soya meal  following  the  introduction 
of the  Common  Ext~rnal 'rariff and  also  the price relationship 
in  the enlarged Community  between  coarse  grains  and  soya  can 
result in  a  more  significant growth  of u.s.  exports  to  the 
enlarged Community  for  these  products  than  was  predicted. 
U.S.  economists  who  formulated  the  short-term estimates have 
themselves  noticed that different factors  could still reduce 
their significance as,  for  example,  a  larger  growth  than ex-
pected of imports  by  the  United  Kingdom. 
The  fears  manifested in  the United States vis-a-vis  eventual 
difficulties in the  period  following  enlargement  are  similar 
to  the  fears  of French  industry at the opening of the  Comrnon 
Market of Six in  1958. 
Experience  proved  that there  are  no  rapid  changes  of  trade 
patterns. 
Moreover,  the  reduction of customs  duties  among  the  ten  Member 
States will not have  a  great effect on  trade  considering  the 
fact that following  the  Kennedy  Round  reductions,  tariff rates 
were  already very  low. 
Finally it is necessary  to  recall  that in  the  enlarged Community, 
the  elimination of  customs  duties  does  not mean  complete  freedom 
of circulation of  products,  given  the  existence  of non-tariff 
barriers which  are  obstacles  to  trade.  On  this point,  the posi-
tion of the  United States will not be  appreciably different from 
that of the  Member  States.  And  when  the  technical obstacles  to 
trade will have  been  eliminated within  the  Community,  the  United 
States will enjoy  comparable  benefits  for  their exports  to  Europe. 
3)  Enlargement of  the  European  Community  should  also  contribute  to 
the  expansion of American  investments. 
Direct American  investments  in  the  Europe  of Ten  already  represented 
$20  billion at the  end of  1970,  $11.7  billion of  which  was  invested 
in  the  present European  Economic  Community  and  $8.3  billion invested 
in  the  United  Kingdom,  Ireland,  Denmark,  and  Norway. 
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American  firms  seem  to  have  quickly realized the positive 
aspects of the  dLmensions  of  the  European market  as  illus-
trated by  the relatively  few  mergers  apd  take-overs  which 
occurred  among  European  firms  compared  to mergers  and  take-
overs  involving European  and  American  firms. 
E!nlargement of the  Community will facilitate greatly circulation 
of goods  within  the  entire territory of  the  Ten  and  consequently 
give opportunities  for  a  better utilization of  the potential  for 
production  and  for marketing of American  subsidiaries which  up  to 
now  belonged either to  the  Europe  of Six or  to  EFTA. 
European  firms  are,  moreover,  becominq  more  and  more  competitive 
in relation  to  American  firms.  The  industrial policy envisaged 
for  the  Community  takes  into account  the  growing  internationali-
zation of  the  economy  because  the  competitiveness  can  no  longer 
be  limited to  the  European  sphere,  but must  be  viewed rather  in 
the  dimensions of the world market. 
The  Commission  made  proposals  which  are still heing  discussed 
among  the  Member  States  in order  to accelerate  the  creation of 
transnational  companies  in Europe. 
This  industrial policy is  a  long-term affair,  but it is  important 
to  stress that it contains  no  discriminatory measure  against the 
United States. 
The  Community,has  not made  as  heavy  direct investments  in the U.S. 
as  the u.s.  has  in  the  Europe  of  Ten.  At  the  end  of  1970,  direct 
investments of the Europe  of Six  in  the  United States represented 
about $3.5  billion and  those  of  the  United  Kingdom,  $4.1  billion. 
These  figures  signify that  the  earnings  from  European  direct in-
vestments  in the  United States  and  repatriated to  the  Community 
are clearly not as  great as  the  $1.4  billion which  the  United 
States would  have  collected in  1970  from  profits made  by  European 
subsidiaries of American  companies. 
This  means  that for  the  balance  of payments  of the  Member  States 
of  the  Europe  of  Ten  or  the  Community  as  a  whole,  exports  to  the 
United States  are significant. 
Europe  would  be  deeply affected and  tempted  to protect itself if 
certain of the protectionist proposals  now  in circulation were, 
one  day,  to  become  part of  U.S.  legislation or regulations . 
. . . I . .. -7-
II.  IN  ORDER  TO  IMPROVE  ECONOMIC  AND  TRADE  llliLATIONS  BETWEEN  .  . 
THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  ENLARGING  COMMUNITY,  IT  IS  IM-
PORTANT  TO  DEFINE  AS  RAPIDLY  AS  POSSIBLE  NEW  FORMS  OF 
COOPERATION. 
l.  One  can first think about  the preparation of  future 
negotiations  in  the  area of trade policy. 
The  rules of the  GATT  applicable  to  the  formation of  a  customs 
union or  a  free  trade  zone  provide  for  certain arrangements  under 
Article  XXIV,  for  the  protection of  the  rights of countries which 
are  not members  of  this  customs  union  or this  free  trade  zone. 
The  Community  is willing to  communicate  to its partners all factors 
for  evaluating the  impact of enlargement on  the tariffs of the 
Europe  of Ten  and  the tariff bindings  formerly  negotiated in  the 
GATT.  The  negotiations  under  this Article will begin  immediately 
after ratification by  the national  Parliaments of the  Ten  of the 
treaties of membership. 
It is,  perhaps,  appropriate  to  place  even  more  emphasis  on  the 
declaration of  intention of the  United States,  Japan,  and  the 
Community  to  begin  a  new  large  trade  negotiation of the  Kennedy 
Round  type  in  1973. 
It will  be  necessary  to  show  proof  of  imagination  in order to 
proceed further  than  a  negotiation of  customs  duties  and  to  look 
at nontariff barriers,  which  include  import restrictions  as  well 
as  aids  to  exports,  and  are  of  a  growing  importance  in  the  trade 
policy of various  countries. 
The  negotiations would  be  undoubtedly  facilitated if the  different 
partners  were  able  to  reach  an  agreement  on  a  range  of criteria 
which  would  permit measures  of  economic  and  financial  assistance 
to be  taken  in  favor  of  companies  and  workers  affected by  inter-
national  competition.  The  notion of  "injury"  must  be  defined  and 
unanimously  recognized within  the  framework  of  the  GATT . 
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These  negotiations  must  also  give  utmost  consideration  to  the 
specific interests of developing  countries.  To  do  this,  it is 
appropriate  that  the  latter be  included as  fully  as  possible 
in  the  preparation of  the negotiations. 
Finally,  it is  important  to  re-examine  the  notion of reciprocity 
and  to  give it a  meaning  more  suitable  for  the  legitimate  demands 
of  the  different partners  and  for  the  conditions  of~change 
between  countries of different structures  and  economic  weights. 
We  must  be  aware  of  the  fact that the  preparation  of such  nego-
tiations will be  a  long  and difficult process if one  truly wants 
to redefine  the  conditions of world  trade  fo~ the  1970's. 
If not,  it would  be  difficult to  go  beyond  a  treading water  approach, 
that is,  a  limited negotiation which  would  postpone  problems  the 
solution of which will  become  more  and  more  difficult. 
However,  in this area,  one  must  be  realistic  :  the  intensive 
preparation of  the  negotiations will not truly begin until  the 
most  important countries,  and  primarily  the  United States,  will 
have  been  able  to obtain  from  their respective  governments  and 
legislative bodies,  negotiative authority which will  define  the 
economic  framework  and  the political  scope  of these negotiations. 
2)  The  United States  and  enlarged Europe  should be  able  to  reconcile 
the particulars  and  the  requirements  of their  agri~!ltural poli-
cies  and  their objectives  for  trade  in agricultural  products. 
Experience  in  GATT  over  the  years  should  have  proven  that most 
countries  have  developed  very  complex  agricultural policies,  char-
acterized by  governmental  intervention  to  protect the  farmers  and 
that agricultural support is generalized. 
Future  agricultural negotiations,  therefore,  in order to  be  possible 
and effective,  must  deal with  the  content of these  policies,  the 
nature  and  the  amount of the  support given  to  the  producers,  and 
all the  instruments  which  ensure  this  support. 
For  the  most  important  agricultural products,  it is  no  longer possible 
to  arrive at satisfactory settlements  in  a  bilateral  framework . 
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Relattons  between  the  United States  and  the  Community  have  provided 
many  examples of the  insufficiency of bilateralism in  the  case  where 
several  countries  agree  to grant export substdies  on  a  specific 
market. 
It is also  important  to  be  convinced of the  limi·t:s  of  a  unilateral 
aggressive  export policy  founded  on  the  lowest possible prices  to 
penetrate  consumers  markets. 
For  useful  negotiations  in agriculture,  a  mul tila.teraJ.  approach  is 
the  only possible  way. 
The  Community,  at the  time  of  the Kennedy  Round,  was  proposing  the 
negotiation of international  commodity  agreements,  for it considered 
that under certain conditions,  these  agreements  could constitute an 
appropriate  framework  for  a  real cooperation. 
Too  many  misunderstandings still exist on  the  subject of inter-
national  commodity  agreements.  It is believed in certain circles 
in  the  United States  that  the mechanisms  which  would  be  set up  for 
these  agreements  are  opposed  to  the  free mechanisms  of the market, 
are  too  constricting and  do  not permit  the  most  efficient countries 
to benefit from  their  comparative  advantages. 
To  avoid  defining  new  agreements,  it has  been  argued  that too 
many  agreements  have  failed  in  the  past,  but  no  one  wants  to  admit 
that these  agreements  have  failed because  they were  insufficient 
from  the  beginning. 
At  the  time  of  the  Kennedy  Round  negotiations,  the  E.E.C.  proposed 
to negotiate  an  international  agreement which  would  have  covered 
all grains  and  not only wheat.  It would  have  combined  commitments 
on  the  amount  of price support,  on  production policy  through  the 
negotiation of  a  self-sufficiency ratio,  on  the  minimum  price 
level  to  be  respected on  the world market  and  finally,  on  food  aid. 
It was  impossible at that time  to  conclude  such  a  type of agreement. 
It would  certainly be  appropriate  to  again  encourage  such  a  global 
approach which,  while  giving priority to  economic  cooperation rather 
than  to  trade confrontation,  appears  necessary  to  obtain positive 
results  in  the agricultural negotiations. 
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It is  fundamental  to discover  new  methods  of negotiation  and 
cooperation  in agriculture  in order  to  reach  common  objectives: 
the  assurance  of sufficient incomes  of  farmers,  the  limitaticn 
of public expenditures  and  the  expansion of  the  international 
trade  of agricultural products. 
In  any  case,  the  industrial  sector would  be  quite  inspired to 
become  interested in negotiations  affecting agriculture,  the 
outcome  of which will  largely determine  the  final  results of 
all of  the negotiations. 
3)  It would  be  especially appropriate  to  en~~age the opportunity 
of  the negotiation of  a  set of rules,  a  sbrt of  code  of good 
behavior,  for multinational  corporations. 
Jean-Jacques  Servan-Schreiber suggests  in his  1968  book,  The 
American  Challenge,  "that fifteen  years  from  now,  it is quite 
possible  the world's  third greatest international  power,  just 
after the  U.S.  and  Russia,  will be  not Europe  but  American  in-
dustry in Europe."  It has  also been  observed that  "U.S.  business 
is more  and  more  the  eleventh menilier  of the  Community  in  terms 
of its investments  there." 
The  Ambassador  of  the  United States  in France  recently recalled 
that in  1970,  the  subsidiaries of American  companies  established 
in that country  employed  4  % of the workers  of the  industry,  com-
prised  10  % of French  exports,  and  paid  9  % of the  taxes  collected 
from  private non-agricultural  firms. 
The  controls  established in  the  United States of capital outflows 
have  not really affected  the  growth  of American  direct investments 
in  Europe.  Th~y have  changed only  the  source  of  financing,  the 
firms  willing to  invest resorting  to  do  so on  the Eurodollar market. 
In  the  United States,  considerations  relative to  the balance of 
trade  and  to  the American  balance of  payments,  discussions  relative 
to  the  competitiveness  and  to  the  progress of technology  in American 
firms,  protectionist  tendencies  expressed by  representatives of 
labor,  all of  these  factors  reveal  the weight  and  the  responsibili~ 
ties of multinational corporations. 
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On  the  international scale,  Japan's  export policy,  the 
Corrununi ty 's progress  toward  economic  and  monetary  union  and 
its enlargement,  Canadian reactions  to  foreign  investment, 
as well  as  the magnitude  of  transactions which  may  be  envisaged 
with countries  such  as  the  U.S.S.R.  and  China,  all stress  the 
importance of multinational corporations,  whether  they  are 
manufacturing  industries or large  commercial  banks. 
No  one  intends  to enclose  the multinational  companies  in  a 
set of rigid rules  which  would  restrain their operations  and 
would  be  completely  contrary  to  their dynamism  and  to  their 
creativity,  to  the  unique  role that  they  can  play  in  inter-
national  economic  expansion. 
In  reality,  the  code  of good  behavior which  one  might  propose, 
could actually facilitate their activities  and  their development 
throughout  the world  and  ease  the  tensions  that their very 
success  provokes. 
Europe  certainly does  not intend to  close itself to  foreign 
investments  and multinational  companies. 
Moreover,  one  might  hope  that European  investments,  not only in 
the  form  of  financial  participation but also in the  form  of 
direct investments will multiply in  the u.s. 
Nevertheless,  it is not yet out of the question  that  the  respon-
sible authorities within  the  enlarged  Community  may  wish  to  have 
assurances  as  to  the  compatibility of  the  activities and  objectives 
of multinational  companies  with  those of the  Community. 
So  it seems  appropriate  that  the  interested parties think  over  a 
set of international guidelines  taking  into  consideration  the 
following  points  : 
the  subsidiaries of American  companies  in Europe  must  have  the 
freedom  to  develop  their production  according  to their specific 
needs,  either on  European  markets  or on  export markets. 
- they must especially be  able  to utilize sources  of supply  which 
are  most  convenient  for  them  and  to  choose  and  develop  freely 
their export markets. 
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- a  subsidiary of  an  American  company  must  not  have  a  dominant 
position  in  the  Conuuunity  to  the point of  preventing  the 
creation of competitive  companies  or  to block all modification 
and  improvement of industrial structures. 
- the  economy  of  the entire  Community or  a  certain  region of 
the  Community must not be  disrupted as  a  result of  a  sudden 
interruption or of  a  transfer of activity decided  upon  by  a 
decision-making center outside the  Community,  without  enough 
consideration for  the political,  economic,  and  social environment. 
CONCLUSION 
Relations  between  the  United States  and  Europe  are at a  turning 
point in  the  sense  that they must  be  adapted to  an  entirely new 
environment resulting either from  changes  occurring in  the  inter-
national  corrlllluni ty,  or  from  the -trends  and  features  of their own 
development. 
It would  not be  favorable  for  the  future  of  the  U.S.-E.E.C. 
relations if the  Community  appeared  as  essentially preoccupied 
with  achieving  successfully its enlargement. 
Consequently,  the  countries  that will  soon  become  the  Europe  of 
Ten  have  decided  to  hold  a  European  Summit  in  the  course  of  next 
October.  The  heads  of State and  government  will  try to  define, 
with  the  participation of  the  European  Commission,  the  new  re-
sponsibilities of  the  enlarged  Community  in its relations with 
the  United States  and  with  the  rest of the world. 
It would  be  equally regrettable if the  United States,  deeply 
engaged  in  the definition of  a  new  world  strategy as  well  as 
in  internal political and  economic  activities,  were  preoccupied 
exclusively by  its own  interests  in  the  making  of  a  foreign 
economic  policy. 
The  United States must  recognize  and  accept  the  fact that the 
interests of  Europe  are  not  in every  case  identical  to  those of 
the  United States,  but  that these  differences  are not  incompatible 
with  their  deep  solidarity. 
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What  is essential now,  for  tl1e  United States  and  for  enlarged 
Europe,  is to  give  evidence of imagination  in defining  hew 
relations between geopolitical entities that are  in better 
balance  but still interdependent. 
They  must act in  such  a  way  that the  challenges  posed by  a 
rapidly changing world permit Europe  and  the  United States 
relations,  beyond  the difficulties of the moment,  to  make 
new  progress. 